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Abstract. A non-linear constrained net-revenue 
model was used to estimate the effects of groundwater 
regulations that allow for accumulation and marketing 
of unused annual irrigation allocations. The research 
shows that such incentives for voluntary reductions in 
current water use are effective, but depend on the 
existence or creation of water rights. The degree of 
effectiveness also depends on crop prices, production 
costs, soil type, and evapotransporation requirements. 
INTRODUCTION 
To examine alternative management approaches, it 
may be useful for policy makers involved in water use 
problems in Georgia and other eastern US states to 
evaluate actions taken by water policy makers in other 
areas of the US. Situations will not be identical, but 
there may be lessons to be learned from actions already 
tried in other states. For example, there is concern in 
some areas of the High Plains that the current rate of 
withdrawal of groundwater for irrigation is lowering 
groundwater levels and, especially in alluvial areas, 
may be diminishing surface water flows. Policymakers 
in the area have promulgated regulations and developed 
incentives for voluntary actions to bring about more 
efficient use of irrigation water to conserve 
groundwater and increase net returns. 
Questions often arise as to whether local control can 
be effective in managing groundwater. The Upper 
Republican River Natural Resources District (URNRD) 
in Nebraska is an example of successful local control 
that has developed a creative and effective approach to 
controlling groundwater withdrawals. The URNRD is a 
three county area in semi-arid southwest Nebraska with 
3,200 irrigation wells and in which groundwater control 
is under the authority of a locally elected Board of 
Directors. The District is funded by local taxes. The 
Board has taken a number of creative and courageous 
steps to address water table declines and conflicts 
among groundwater users. 
The URNRD requires metering of all irrigation 
wells (meters are sealed, read, and serviced by URNRD 
staff). The District has a limit on irrigated acres per 
well, a moratorium on new wells, and a 14.5"/acre/year 
allocation for all irrigation wells. Allocations are given 
in 5-year allotments. Producers can carry forward 
unused annual allocations to the next year, allowing 
year-to-year flexibility. Also, they can carry forward 
unused allocations into the next five-year allotment 
period. Annual allocations (initially at 22" and now at 
14.5") have been in place for 20 years. As allocations 
were reduced and cost share funds were provided by 
the District, there was widespread conversion to more 
efficient irrigation systems (e.g., center pivots, low-
pressure drops, and use of rain gauge shut-offs). 
Average water use in the District during the years of the 
study was 11.3"/acre, and most farmers have 
accumulated carryovers (unused allocations), which 
provide a "cushion" within which to operate. 
Exacerbating the concern about pumping rates, the 
URNRD and three other NRDs in the Republican River 
Basin are involved in a US Supreme Court lawsuit filed 
by Kansas against Nebraska and Colorado. Kansas 
claims that water delivery from the River into Kansas 
has diminished due to groundwater pumping in 
Nebraska. If Kansas prevails, there may be pressures to 
reduce allocations in the URNRD, and to impose 
allocations elsewhere in the Basin. 
BACKGROUND 
There are two general approaches that a regulatory 
agency can take to restrict water use: "command and 
control" (CC); and incentives for voluntary 
conservation. Under the CC approach, the agency 
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specifies an allocation for each producer and monitors 
for compliance. Because of the cost of gathering 
information, such regulations are usually uniform for 
all producers. The CC method can be effective at 
achieving the desired total water use, but often at a high 
cost because restrictive uniform regulations are 
normally economically inefficient. The voluntary 
incentive approach would provide economic incentives 
for producers to use less water. 
The URNRD Board has instituted a combination of 
both approaches. Water allocations are imposed on 
producers, but there are incentives for conservation and 
flexibility built into the rules. In addition to allowing 
carryforward of unused allocations, the Board recently 
instituted a water-banking rule, which provides for 
deposits and withdrawals of allocations. The "Bank" 
operated by the District will allow for changes in point 
of use and/or point of withdrawal, and in type of use. 
The rule opens the possibility of direct water 
marketing. Producers know that accumulated 
allocations enhance land prices for those wishing to 
sell. They now also know that they have a direct 
marketing potential for those allocations. 
A legal right to water is essential to water 
marketing. Nebraska law does not designate ownership 
of groundwater, except that the landowner has the right 
to beneficial use of groundwater. However, it is argued 
that URNRD rules and producer action have created 
usufructuary ) groundwater rights, which reinforce the 
new banking rule. 
Because producers can accumulate unused 
allocations, they have an incentive to account for the 
potential value of future income from each inch of 
irrigation water conserved for future use or sale. The 
question they face is whether it is more valuable to use 
an extra inch now for increased crop yield or to bank 
that extra inch for use or sale in the future. Stated 
alternatively, they should consider the marginal user 
cost of each inch of water, if consumed now. Marginal 
user cost is the opportunity cost of using the 
groundwater in the current period, and is equivalent to 
the present value of foregone marginal net benefits in a 
future period (Carlson et al., 1993). Marginal user cost 
for these producers is positive because URNRD 
regulations have changed an unlimited-access common 
property resource into a restricted-use common 
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary: 
"USUFRUCT. The right to utilize and enjoy the profits and 
advantages of something belonging to another so long as the 
property is not damaged or altered."  
property resource and generated a usufructuary right to 
hold or market unused allocations. 
OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research were to: 
1. Analyze the effect of the current allocation and 
carryover rules in the URNRD on the water use 
behavior of the irrigator; and 
2. Provide producers and policymakers with 
information about net revenue effects of 
existing and future potential water use 
regulations in southwest Nebraska. 
The research did not address the issue of the 
optimal rate of use of the aquifer. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN - MODEL AND DATA 
The Model 
The model is based on the assumption that the each 
irrigator attempts to distribute per acre annual use and 
accumulated allocations of water in a manner that 
maximizes the present value of net returns from the 
water, including the value to the irrigator of water 
saved for future use or sale. The model was formulated 
in a dynamic optimization framework with the 
assumption that each producer attempts to maximize 
present net value of irrigation water use and allocations 
as affected by: 
• the water allocation granted by the Board for the 
planning period; 
• the amount of irrigation water used in each period 
(inches/acre); 
• the amount of accumulated water allocation at end 
of the individual's planning period; 
• a discount factor for discounting future net returns; 
• the expected price of corn ($/bu); 
• the yield (Y) function for corn (bu/acre); 
• non-irrigation inputs; 
• exogenous 	factors 	such 	as 	rainfall, 
evapotranspiration, and soil characteristics; 
• the cost of pumping water ($/acre-inch); 
• other input costs; and 
• the value of the saved water at the end of the 
planning period. 
The model, following the new URNRD regulation, 
allows for direct marketing of unused allocations and/or 
selling the land with the unused allocation capitalized 
into the land price. The solution to the model is based 
on the irrigators desire to optimally choose the amount 
of water used each year so that the marginal net value 
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(MNV) of an extra inch of irrigation equals the 
discounted marginal value of an extra inch saved for 
use/sale in the future (i.e., marginal user cost, MUC). 
In order to calculate the marginal values and net 
returns, a yield-irrigation response function for corn 
was postulated and estimated. The model predicted 
yield as a function of: 
• inches of irrigation water applied per acre; 
• crop irrigation requirement (CIR) of the crop; CIR 
is equal to potential evapotranspiration (PET) 
minus effective rainfall (in/acre); and 
• average soil water holding capacity for each 
producer's field (inches per foot of soil). 
Standard statistical tests of significance were used for 
estimated statistical functions and the usual hypotheses. 
Data 
Water use, yield, and other data were collected 
through a producer survey and from URNRD water use 
records. Soil types for each field were obtained from 
county soils maps and used to estimate the average 
water-holding capacities of the fields. Crop irrigation 
requirement was calculated using local rainfall and 
potential evapotranspiration (PET) data. Daily rainfall 
and PET data were collected from eleven weather 
stations located in or adjacent to the URNRD. Effective 
rainfall during the growing season at these locations 
was estimated by subtracting runoff from storm rainfall. 
Runoff amounts were calculated using a method 
developed by the Soil Conservation Service in 1972 
(Chow et al., 1988). 
The three nearest stations to each field were 
identified and crop irrigation requirement (PET minus 
effective rainfall) was estimated by using an inverse 
weighted distance formula. 
Pumping costs were estimated using software 
developed by the University of Nebraska (Selley, 
1998). Pump costs across producers varied due to 
energy type, energy price, pumping capacity of the 
well, feet of pumping lift, and water pressure at the 
well. Energy prices (electric and diesel) were collected 
from utility companies and diesel suppliers in the area. 
Corn price used was the expected price of corn for 
the new crop in each year. It was estimated as the 
average of the June through September weekly future 
prices for the December corn (new crop) contract minus 
the expected basis for the area. 
STUDY RESULTS 
Marginal User Costs Under Current Regulations 
For all soils, irrigation use by producers in the 
survey averaged 11.3 in/acre from 1995-98. Use ranged 
from 10.8" on high water-holding-capacity (WHC) 
soils (loamy and silt loamy) to 12.2" for low WHC 
sandy soils. Marginal user cost (MUC), which equals 
marginal net value (MNV) of an extra acre-inch of 
water (at optimum use), for all soils averaged 
$2.80/acre. MUC values ranged from $2.10/acre for 
high WHC soils to $4.01/acre for the low WHC soils. 
Estimated Water Use without Water Regulations 
The study indicates that if the producers were 
operating without the water use regulations of the 
URNRD, they would maximize current net returns per 
acre by equating the MNV = 0, where marginal user 
cost (value of saved water) is zero. The estimated 
irrigation use under this scenario was 12.7 in/acre 
across all soils, 1.4" more than the actual average use. 
Results using Average Values for Climate, Price, 
and Pump Cost 
Under these average conditions, the overall water 
savings ranged from one-half inch on high WHC soils 
to. 2 in/acre on low WHC soils. Marginal user cost 
ranged from less than $.80 on high WHC soils to 
almost $2.50 on the low WHC soils. The cost in 
foregone current net revenue from voluntarily using 
less water on a sandy soil was about $3.30/acre, five 
times higher than on a loamy soil. 
Reasons for Conserving Water 
Assuming that the producers in the survey are 
"rational", economic theory implies the irrigators 
believe conserving some of their water for future 
use/sale is worth at least as much as the revenue given 
up by not using the water. There are several reasons for 
saving water that may explain the different marginal 
user cost values for producers: 
1. Building up the carryover in their water 
account enhances a producer's ability to have 
enough water in the event of a multi-year 
drought. 
2. The value of the banked water is capitalized 
into the value of the land. For the owner, this is 
a form of investment. For a renter of the pivot, 
this could mean trying to keep water use to 1. 
minimum to enhance the chance of a longer 
lease. (Some owners impose penalties on 
renters if they exceed a certain amount of water 
use within the 5-year allotment period.) 
3. Foreseeing the potential to market water in the 
near future, producers may be banking water 
with a plan to sell the excess later on. 
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Because of the URNRD rule allowing accumulation 
of unused allocations, and the potential to sell these 
allocations in the future, sacrificing current income to 
conserve water for future use or sale appears to be the 
typical behavior by producers in the URNRD. 
Potential Effect of Reduced Allocations 
Results of this component of the study showed that 
the average water uses with the 10 and 8-inch 
allocations are estimated to be 2.1 and 3.6 in/acre less, 
respectively, than under the current allocation. The 
corresponding average costs to producers, in terms of 
decreased net revenue, are $3.79 and $12.91 per acre 
respectively for the 10" and the 8" allocations. If these 
costs occurred for every irrigated acre in the district 
(460,000 acres), the aggregate total costs would be $1.7 
to $5.9 million, respectively. If water use reductions 
equal to the 8-inch allocation occurred for every well in 
the district, approximately 138,000 acre-feet of water 
would be conserved annually. 
The impact of restrictive allocations varies 
considerably, from a low of $1.26/acre for the 10-inch 
allocation on high WHC soils to a high of $24.16/acre 
for the 8-inch allocation on low WHC soils. Producers 
with low WHC soils incur the largest costs under both 
allocations because each acre-inch less they use results 
in a greater loss of yi6ld as compared to the other soil 
types. These changes in net revenue could, in part, be 
mitigated over time by new technology in irrigation 
techniques and crop genetics, and improved irrigation 
management. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The past 20 years of metering, regulation of water 
use, and conservation incentives in the Upper 
Republican River Natural Resources District led to the 
adoption by producers of water-conserving irrigation 
technologies and improved irrigation management. This 
research indicates that producers have been voluntarily 
conserving water for future use or sale at the cost of 
foregone current net income. Clearly, the ability of 
producers to carryforward unused allocations provides 
an incentive to reduce current water use in the District. 
The economically rational producer will use water 
to the point where the value of the last inch in current 
use is equal to the value of that inch in future use or 
sale. This marginal user cost of another acre-inch of 
water averaged $2.80 across four years for all 
producers in the survey. On a per acre basis, producers 
are voluntarily saving an average of 1.4"/acre at a cost 
(i.e., foregone current net return) of almost $8.00/acre. 
Marginal user costs and differences in net returns 
varied considerably by soil type. The lower the water 
holding capacity of the soil, the higher the marginal 
user cost and foregone current net revenue. 
If the URNRD Board or a US Supreme Court ruling 
determines in the future that the allocation needs to be 
reduced, this study provides a starting point for 
determining the potential costs to producers of such 
actions. Aquifer sustainability versus economic 
viability of agriculture in the region will need to be 
considered. An 8-inch allocation might sustain irrigated 
agriculture for longer than a 10-inch allocation, but the 
average cost is almost 3.5 times higher. 
Another question that arises in the URNRD is 
whether continuing uniform allocations are appropriate, 
given that, on average, it takes 3.3 more inches/acre to 
maximize current net returns on sandy soils as 
compared to high WHC soils. However, with marketing 
of water a possibility, any such "inequities" might be 
alleviated. For example, the research determined that 
with a 10-inch allocation, an irrigator on a high WHC 
soil would be willing to sell an inch for $1.84 or more, 
and a sandy soil irrigator would be willing to pay up to 
$4.77. If water is marketed at a price in between these 
two levels, then both producers should be better off. 
It is important to note that some individuals 
question the desirability of marketing groundwater, and 
claim that large cities, for example, may be able to pay 
more than agriculture. If this is a major concern, it 
could be overcome by restricting transfers between 
uses, i.e., agriculture to municipalities. This would, 
however, impact on the overall economic efficiency of 
water allocation. 
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